2023年度の活動報告

2023年5月27日 武蔵大学国際シンポジューム『日本と世界の長期経済停滞は新しい世界大恐慌の始まりか:第2部ヨーロッパとアジア』 Secular Stagnation as a New Great Depression Part II Europe and Asia

【セッション1 World and Europe】
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPw6hrqXI9A
【セッション2 China and Japan】
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uGhDmXYwE2E
【討論(Round Table)】
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wW1j68gQg2Q

【プログラム】
 ●開会のあいさつ
  横川信治、Jayati Ghosh

 ●セッション1 ヨーロッパとアジア
  Prabhat Patnaik (Jawaharlal Nehru University)
   “Neo-liberal Capitalism at a Dead-end.”
  Costas Lapavitsas and Matteo Giordano (SOAS, University of London)
   “Hegemony in Europe: Allowing the EMU to tick over.”
  Michael Landesmann (the Johannes Kepler University)
   “Europe having to adjust to a new geo-political and geo-economic environment: a Structural Political Economy (SPE)
          approach.”

 ●セッション2 中国と日本
  丸川知雄 (東京大学)
   “China’s Premature Demographic Transition.”
  Sébastien Lechevalier (EHESS)
   “Beyond Society 5.0 and new capitalism: how and why a care-led innovation model in Japan can help overcoming
          secular stagnation.”
  Hugh Whittaker (University of Oxford)
   “Three Spirits of Japanese Capitalism.”

 ●パネルディスカッション
  Jomo Kwame Sundaram (the University of Malaya)
  佐藤創(南山大学)
  Jayati Gohsh (the University of Massachusetts Amhers

 ●閉会のあいさつ
  横川信治

【概要】
After the global financial crisis of 2008 and the following secular stagnation, we face the interregnum of the second hegemonic capitalist world system. Old hegemons, namely the USA and the EU, have started to lose control: (1) international monetary systems and regional monetary systems tend to cause bubbles and busts; (2) trade wars have started between the USA and China; (3) anti-establishment movements, such as populism, have become strong; and (4) wars have started. On the other hand, potential new hegemons, such as China (and possibly India), are not ready to establish a new world system. The symposia presentations address the heart of secular stagnation and the second interregnum.

セッション1:ヨーロッパ と世界
Prabhat Patnaik argues that Neo-liberal capitalism brings about a de-segmentation of the world economy whereby wages in the “north” remain subdued by being linked to the massive labor reserves of the “south,” even as these reserves swell despite the relocation of activities from the “north” to the “south.” At the same time, labor productivity rises everywhere; the net result is a rise in the share of surplus in total output worldwide, which creates an ex ante tendency toward over-production. This tendency has now manifested as a secular stagnation of the world economy, which cannot be overcome within the neo-liberal regime itself.
Costas Lapavitsas and Matteo Giordano argue that institutional change in the Eurozone is driven by the need to ensure the euro’s immediate survival rather than confronting the structural weaknesses of the common currency. The system allows the euro to survive but also facilitates the rise of intra-EMU imbalances, as is reflected in divergent claims and liabilities of member states, leading Germany to accumulate intra-EMU claims on others. Instability thus becomes entrenched in the Union, while Germany maintains a hegemonic position.
Michael Landesmann applies a structural-political economy framework to study centrifugal and centripetal forces in three crises that impacted the European integration process: the financial crisis of 2008/9 and its aftermath, the COVID-19 crisis, and the Russia-Ukraine war. It emphasizes that the cumulative impact of these three crises forces shifts in the interests of key political actors (countries, sectors, social constituencies) to address “systemic instability” at the EU level.

セッション2:中国と日本
Tomoo Marukawa shows that policy changes and encouragement have not raised China’s total fertility rate. China has entered the stage of an “aged society,” with the aged population accounting for 14.2 percent of the total population in 2021. With a rapid decline in labor supply, China may get old before it gets rich.
Sebastien Lechevalier argues that although the Silicon Valley model has been the best set of institutions to promote innovation in the new technological environment of neoliberalism, it is costly and unequal. He looks for new ways of thinking about the nature of innovation processes, their relation to markets, and their contribution to social well-being.
Hugh Whittaker questions whether the 1990s mark the onset of the crisis in Japan with a growing lack of institutional coherence; is there any evidence for the emergence of a new institutional coherence and a new “spirit” of Japanese capitalism amidst the flurry of initiatives (new capitalism, DX, GX, Society 5.0, etc.)? He argues that Japan may become a post-neoliberal frontrunner with three spirits: financialized capitalism, return of the developmental state/state capitalism, and communitarian capitalism.