配付用

武蔵大学大学院
経済学研究科
博士後期課程

2025 年度入試
入試問題（外国語科目：英語）

※問題 1 から問題 4 のうち、2 題を選択し日本語で解答すること。

問題１　日本における少子化に関して、子育ての現状と問題、そして企業と政府が果たすべき役割について、以下の文が述べている内容を 600 字程度でまとめなさい。

A year has passed since Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced “unprecedented measures” to address the nation’s low birth rate. The measures, which were finally decided in December after much debate, mainly over financial resources, seem a bit small-scale to be called “unprecedented.” However, awareness has clearly spread more widely than ever over the past year that Japan’s declining birth rate is a crisis that could shake the nation’s future.

Japan’s total fertility rate — the average number of children a woman is estimated to give birth to in her lifetime — has been below the level required to maintain a stable population for the past 50 years. Various trends have been analyzed as factors behind the decline, including changes in social structure and economic situations. But could changes in people’s attitudes toward having children and parenting also be behind the decline?

To find out, a group of reporters that I am part of has been running a series of articles titled “Shoshika: Watashi no Riaru” (Low birth rate: My reality) in Japanese in The Yomiuri Shimbun’s Lifestyle section since last May, in which people, mainly those who are raising children, speak frankly about what they feel and think about parenting in Japan. The articles have been published once a month in principle, and we have interviewed about 100 people so far.

What emerged from the interviews were the difficulties women face in raising children and their frustration over the responsibility being unevenly distributed to them. While it is true that most of the interviewees were women, none of the male interviewees or men who wrote to us about the articles said they were raising their children alone because their wives were busy with work. In contrast, many of the women did say they were raising their children alone because their husbands were busy with work.

For example, a 37-year-old mother and company employee in Tokyo is currently on parental leave to raise her two young daughters, but her husband, who works in the financial sector, “goes to the office on the first train [of the day] and comes home on the last train.”

“I often talk to my children’s pediatrician [instead of my husband] about parenting issues,” she said.

A 38-year-old mother in Kanagawa Prefecture, who is also a company employee, said her systems engineer husband used to “work late nights and on weekends” when their first child was a toddler

about 10 years ago. She was also a systems engineer at that time, but she had to give up the job, which she loved, to take care of their child.

And a 40-year-old mother of three children has moved to Hokkaido due to her husband's job transfer. He is rarely home on weekdays and is sometimes away even on weekends, so she takes care of the children almost alone. "Weekday nights are especially hectic. I cook, feed the children and bathe them. I need another adult hand," she said.

These women's stories highlight an unequal division of childcare responsibility that is also evident in statistical data. According to a survey in 2021 by the Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry of married couples with children under 6, husbands spend an average of about two hours a day on housework and childcare, while wives spend about 7½ hours.

Of course, most husbands do not work overtime voluntarily. In many workplaces across the country, the culture encourages working long hours. A 38-year-old father and company employee in Tokyo, who took nine months of parental leave two years ago and has tried to work as little overtime as possible since then, said two junior colleagues were promoted past him.

Currently, only about 17% of men take parental leave. The government's measures put particular emphasis on improving that to 85% by 2030, by expanding parental leave benefits to ease the childcare responsibilities on women. However, hearing about the Tokyo man's experience shows it will not be so easy to achieve the goal. Besides, parenting does not end with several months or a year of parental leave.

Reviewing the articles, I think not only the government but also companies should make greater contributions to dealing with the country's population problem. They should reduce the working hours of their employees, allow them to work remotely and allow them to work early in the morning instead of at night, so that balancing work and family becomes a little easier.

Haruka Shibata, a 45-year-old father of three daughters and a sociology professor at Kyoto University who studies theories of happiness, says introducing more flexible work styles should be prioritized in Japan's efforts to address the declining birth rate. Shibata cites research showing that in Scandinavian countries and France, where there is extensive support for parent-friendly work arrangements including flexible working-hour systems and paid leave, the level of happiness is relatively high and does not decline even after having children, while in the United States and Australia, where there is not much support, the level of happiness is relatively low and declines further after having children. He also said that countries with higher levels of national happiness

tend to have higher birth rates.

Considering how remote work surged during the pandemic, only to fade away afterward, it can be said that companies do not voluntarily promote flexible work styles.

“In Japan’s case, it would be effective to revise the Labor Standards Law, such as by increasing the wage premium rate for overtime work. It would also be effective to make the ‘interval system’ mandatory,” Shibata said. The system was designed to secure a certain length of time between when workers go home and when they return to work the next day, but companies now are only obliged to “make efforts” to have the system. If the government shows its seriousness by revising the law, then the companies will also be more serious about reducing working hours. Revising the law may entail serious side effects such as increasing bankruptcy and unemployment, so the government should offer support for companies to increase the efficiency of their operations, such as by promoting digitization. “If working hours are reduced through these efforts, men will be able to take on more childcare and housework responsibilities, and women will be more inclined to marry. If marriage increases, it will push up the birth rate,” Shibata said.

Companies need to think more about their future benefits. The decrease in the young population is already having a significant impact, such as labor shortages, on corporate activities and will lead to economic stagnation and market contraction in the future. There are good reasons for companies to make efforts to address the declining birth rate.

（出典）Ikuko Higuchi, “Companies Should Make More Serious Efforts to Address Low Birth Rate”, *The Japan News*, 20 Jan. 2024.

問題２　次の文を読んで設問に答えよ。

Toyota is often called the most Japanese of the Japanese auto companies, being located in insular Nagoya rather than cosmopolitan Tokyo. For many years its workforce was composed largely of former agricultural workers. In Tokyo, the firm was often derided as “a bunch of farmers.” Yet today, Toyota is regarded by most industry observers as the most efficient and highest-quality producer of motor vehicles in the world.

The founding Toyoda family succeeded first in the textile machinery business during the late nineteenth century by developing superior technical features on its looms. In the late 1930s, at the government’s urging, the company entered the motor-vehicle industry, specializing in trucks for the military. It had barely gone beyond building a few prototype cars with craft methods before war broke out and auto production ended. After the war, Toyota was determined to go into full-scale car and commercial truck manufacturing, but it faced ①a host of problems.

The domestic market was tiny and demanded a wide range of vehicles—luxury cars for government officials, large trucks to carry goods to market, small trucks for Japan’s small farmers, and small cars suitable for Japan’s crowded cities and high energy prices.

The native Japanese workforce, as Toyota and other firms soon learned, was no longer willing to be treated as a variable cost or as interchangeable parts. What was more, the new labor laws introduced by the American occupation greatly strengthened the position of workers in negotiating more favorable conditions of employment. Management’s right to lay off employees was severely restricted, and the bargaining position of company unions representing all employees was greatly reinforced. The company unions used their strength to represent everyone, eliminating the distinction between blue- and white-collar workers, and secured a share of company profits in the form of bonus payments in addition to basic pay.

Furthermore, in Japan there were no “guest workers”—that is, temporary immigrants willing to put up with substandard working conditions in return for high pay—or minorities with limited occupational choice. In the West, by contrast, these individuals had formed the core of the workforce in most mass-production companies.

The war-ravaged Japanese economy was starved for capital and for foreign exchange, meaning that massive purchases of the latest Western production technology were quite impossible.

The outside world was full of huge motor-vehicle producers who were anxious to establish operations in Japan and ready to defend their established markets against Japanese exports.

This last difficulty provoked ②a response from the Japanese government, which soon issued a prohibition on direct foreign investment in the Japanese motor industry. This prohibition was critical for Toyota (as well as other entrants in the Japanese auto industry) to gain a toehold in the car-making business. It wasn’t enough, however, to guarantee the company’s success beyond Japan.

Besides, the government nearly went too far. After the prohibition on foreign ownership and the

imposition of high tariff barriers had encouraged a host of Japanese firms to enter the auto industry by the early 1950s, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) had second thoughts. MITI believed that the first requirement of an internationally competitive auto industry was high production scale, so it proposed a series of plans to merge Japan's twelve embryonic car companies into a Japanese Big Two or Big Three to battle Detroit's Big Three. The merged companies were to specialize in different sizes of cars to prevent "excessive" domestic competition and to gain high scale to compete on price in export markets.

③What if these plans had succeeded?

The Japanese industry might have grown rapidly at first, but it would probably have shared the fate of the current Korean motor industry. That is, as the advantage of lower wages gradually disappeared, the new-entrant Japanese producers, with nothing new to offer in production techniques and limited competition at home, would have become also-rans in the world motor industry. They might have been able to protect their domestic market, but they would have posed no long-term threat to the established firms elsewhere in the world using the same techniques.

Instead, Toyota, Nissan, and the other companies defied MITI and set out to become full-range car producers with a variety of new models. Toyota's chief production engineer, Taiichi Ohno, quickly realized that employing Detroit's tools—and Detroit's methods—was not suited to this strategy. Craft-production methods were a well-known alternative but seemed to lead nowhere for a company intent on producing mass-market products. Ohno knew he needed a new approach, and he found it. We can look at the stamping shop for a good example of how his new techniques worked.

（出典）James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones, Daniel Roos, and Donna Sammons Carpenter, *The Machine That Changed the World,* Free Press, 1990.

問１　下線部①について、どのような問題に直面していたか。

問２　下線部②について、日本政府の対応はどのようなものであったか。

問３　下線部③について、もしそうだったらどうなっていたか、また実際の各社の対応はどうだったか。

問題３　次の文の下線部①～⑦を日本語に訳しなさい。

What are the main lessons that can be drawn from this new economic and social history? The most obvious is no doubt the following: inequality is first of all a social, historical, and political construction. In other words, for the same level of economic or technological development, there are always many different ways of organizing a property system or a border system, a social and political system or a fiscal and educational system. These options are political in nature. They depend on the state of power relationships between the various social groups and the worldviews involved, and they lead to inegalitarian levels and structures that are extremely variable, depending on societies and periods. All creations of wealth in history have issued from a collective process: they depend on the international division of labor, the use of worldwide natural resources, and the accumulation of knowledge since the beginnings of humanity. ①Human societies constantly invent rules and institutions in order to structure themselves and to divide up wealth and power, but always on the basis of reversible political choices.

The second lesson is that since the end of the eighteenth century there has been a long-term movement toward equality. ②This is the consequence of conflicts and revolts against injustice that have made it possible to transform power relationships and overthrow institutions supported by the dominant classes, which seek to structure social inequality in a way that benefits them, and to replace them with new institutions and new social, economic, and political rules that are more equitable and emancipatory for the majority. Generally speaking, the most fundamental transformations seen in the history of inegalitarian regimes involve social conflicts and large-scale political crises. It was the peasant revolts of 1788–1789 and the events of the French Revolution that led to the abolition of the nobility's privileges. Similarly, ③it was not muted discussions in Paris salons but the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue in 1791 that led to the beginning of the end of the Atlantic slavery system. In the course of the twentieth century, social and trade-union mobilizations played a major role in the establishment of new power relationships between capital and labor and in the reduction of inequalities. The two world wars can also be analyzed as the consequence of social tensions and contradictions connected with the intolerable inequality that prevailed before 1914, both domestically and internationally. In the United States, it took a devastating civil war to put an end to the slavery system in 1865. A century later, in 1965, the Civil Rights movement succeeded in abolishing the system of legal racial discrimination (without, however, putting an end to discrimination that was illegal and nonetheless still very real). Examples are many: in the 1950s and 1960s the wars of independence played a central role in ending European colonialism; it took decades of riots and mobilizations to do away with South African apartheid in 1994, and so on.

In addition to revolutions, wars, and revolts, economic and financial crises often serve as turning points where social conflicts are crystallized and power relationships are redefined. The crisis of

the 1930s played a central part in the long-lasting delegitimation of economic liberalism and the justification of new forms of state intervention. ④More recently, the financial crisis of 2008 and the worldwide Covid-19 pandemic in 2020–2021 have already begun to overturn various certainties that shortly before had been considered irrefutable, certainties concerning, for example, the acceptable level of public debt or the role of central banks. On a more local but still significant scale, the revolt of the gilets jaunes ("yellow vests") in France in 2018 ended with the government's abandonment of its plan to increase the carbon tax, which is particularly inegalitarian. At the beginning of the 2020s, the Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, and Fridays for Future movements are showing an impressive ability to mobilize people around racial, gender, and climatic inequalities, across national borders and generations. Taking into account the social and environmental contradictions of the current economic system, it is likely that such revolts, conflicts, and crises will continue to play a central role in the future, under circumstances that it is impossible to predict with precision. The end of history will not come tomorrow. ⑤The movement toward equality still has a long way to go, especially in a world in which the poorest, and particularly the poorest in the poorest countries, are preparing to be subjected, with increasing violence, to climatic and environmental damage caused by the richest people's way of life.

It is also important to highlight another lesson issuing from history, namely that struggles and power relationships are not sufficient as such. ⑥They are a necessary condition for overturning inegalitarian institutions and established powers, but unfortunately they do not in any way guarantee that the new institutions and the new powers that will replace them will always be as egalitarian and emancipatory as we might have hoped.

The reason for this is simple. Although it is easy to denounce the inegalitarian or oppressive nature of established institutions and governments, it is much harder to agree on the alternative institutions that will make it possible to make real progress toward social, economic, and political equality, while at the same time respecting individual rights, including the right to be different. The task is not at all impossible, but it requires us to accept deliberation, the confrontation of differing points of view, compromises, and experimentation. ⑦Above all, it requires us to accept the fact that we can learn from the historical trajectories and experiences of others, and especially that the exact content of just institutions is not known a priori and is worth debating as such. Concretely, we will see that since the end of the eighteenth century, the march toward equality has been based on the development of a number of specific institutional arrangements that have to be studied as such: equality before the law; universal suffrage and parliamentary democracy; free and obligatory education; universal health insurance; progressive taxes on income, inheritance, and property; joint management and labor law; freedom of the press; international law; and so on.

＊Saint-Domingue：サン・ドマング。カリブ海のフランス植民地。

（出典）Thomas Piketty, *A Brief History of Equality*, Harvard University Press, 2022.

問題４　次の文の下線部①～⑦を日本語に訳しなさい。

The arguments positing that western Europe's economy was uniquely capable of generating an industrial transformation generally fall into two clusters. The first, typified by the work of E. L. Jones, argues that ①beneath a surface of "preindustrial" similarity, sixteenth- through eighteenth-century Europe had already moved far ahead of the rest of its world in the accumulation of both physical and human capital. A central tenet of this view is that various customary checks on fertility (late marriage, a celibate clergy, etc.) allowed Europe to escape from the otherwise universal condition of a "pre-modern fertility regime" and thus from a similarly universal condition in which population growth absorbed almost all of any increase in production. Consequently, ②Europe was uniquely able to adjust its fertility to hard times and to increase its per capita (not just total) capital stock over the long haul.

Thus, in this view, differences in the demographic and economic behavior of ordinary farmers, artisans, and traders created a Europe that could support more non-farmers; equip its people with better tools (including more livestock); make them better nourished, healthier, and more productive; and create a larger market for goods above and beyond the bare necessities. The central arguments underlying this position were laid out over thirty years ago by John Hajnal: they have been elaborated since then, but not radically altered. However, as we shall see in chapter 1, ③ recent work on birthrates, life expectancy, and other demographic variables in China, Japan, and (more speculatively) Southeast Asia has made what Hajnal thought were unique European achievements look more and more ordinary.

The significance of these findings has not yet been fully appreciated, but they have been partially acknowledged in the one important recent addition to the demographically driven story line: the recognition that there were economic booms and rising living standards in preindustrial settings outside Europe. However, ④these are always treated as temporary flowerings that either proved vulnerable to political shifts or played themselves out as productivity enhancing innovations proved unable to stay ahead of the population increases that prosperity encouraged.

Such stories are an important advance over much earlier literature, which argued either implicitly or explicitly that the whole world was poor and accumulation minimal until the early modern European breakthrough; among other things, it has forced scholars to look at "the fall of Asia" as well as the "rise of Europe." However, these versions of the story are often anachronistic in at least two crucial ways.

First, ⑤they tend to read too much of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century ecological disasters that have afflicted much of Asia (and the underlying problem of dense population) back into earlier periods and present eighteenth-century Asian societies as having exhausted all the possibilities available to them. Some versions attribute this condition to all of an artificial unit called "Asia" circa 1800; but, as we shall see, India, Southeast Asia, and even parts of China still

had a good deal of room to accommodate more people without either a major technological breakthrough or a decline in the standard of living. Probably only a few parts of China and Japan faced such a situation.

Second, such stories often "internalize" the extraordinary ecological bounty that Europeans gained from the New World. Some do so by assimilating overseas expansion to the pattern of "normal" frontier expansion within Europe (e.g., the clearing and settlement of the Hungarian plain or the Ukraine, or of German forests). ⑥This ignores the exceptional scale of the New World windfall, the exceptionally coercive aspects of colonization and the organization of production there, and the role of global dynamics in ensuring the success of European expansion in the Americas. The clearing of new agricultural lands in Hungary and the Ukraine had parallels in Sichuan, Bengal, and many other Old World locales; what happened in the New World was very different from anything in either Europe or Asia. Moreover, because nineteenth-century Europe found enormous ecological relief beyond its borders—both acquiring resources and exporting settlers—such accounts rarely consider whether some densely populated core regions in sixteenth- through eighteenth-century Europe faced ecological pressures and options not radically different from those of core regions in Asia.

Thus, the literature that incorporates the "fall of Asia" tends to do so with the aid of an oversimplified contrast between an ecologically played-out China, Japan, and/or India, and ⑦a Europe with plenty of room left to grow—a Europe that, in one formulation, had the "advantages of backwardness" because it had not yet developed enough to make full use of its internal resources.

（出典）Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence*, Princeton University Press, 2021.